Sensor network is an important approach of data capturing. User authentication is a critical security issue for sensor networks because sensor nodes are deployed in an open and unattended environment, leaving them possible hostile attack. Some researchers proposed some user authentication protocols using one-way hash function or using biometric technology. Recently, Yel et al. and Wenbo et al. proposed a user authentication protocols using elliptic curves cryptography. However, there are some security weaknesses for these protocols. In the paper, we review several proposed user authentication protocols, with a detail review of the Wenbo et al.'s user authentication protocol and a cryptanalysis of this protocol that shows several security weaknesses. Furthermore, we propose a secure user authentication protocol using identity-based cryptography to overcome those weaknesses. Finally, we present the security analysis, a comparison of security, computation, and performance for the proposed protocols, which shows that this user authentication protocol is more secure and suitable for higher security WSNs.
Introduction
With the application of big data, there are some base manipulation processes: data capturing, data transport, data storage, data extraction & integration, data analysis & interpretation and data application. In the data capturing, using all kinds of devices and methods to collect data, such as smart devices, sensors, Web. So there are three important approaches of data capturing: Internet, Internet of Things (IoT) and sensor network [1] . Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs) is an open environment distributed network, which is an important approach of data capturing for big data. Nevertheless, with the application of dig data, the requirement of real-time data from WSNs is increasing highly. In some situations the gateway impossibly does force a user to access the sensor node directly. In such case the security and reliability to inquire and data disseminate are very important. Only when every client (remote sensor node, remote user) in the WSNs proves his/her identity can he/she be allowed to join the WSNs and access to resource, such as realtime data. Thus, a key security requirement for WSNs is user authentication [2] [3] [4] [5] .
In 2004, Sastry et al. [2] proposed a security scheme using access control lists (ACL) for IEEE 802.15.4 networks in the gateway node. An ACL would be maintained in gateway node and sensor nodes. Watro et al. [6] proposed a user authentication protocol using RSA and Differ-Hellman algorithm, but which was open to hostile attack by a user masquerading.
In 2005, Benenson et al. [7] proposed a user authentication protocol based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) to handle the sensor node capture attack, which relied on a trusted third party.
In 2006, Wong et al. [8] proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme for WSNs based on a light-weight strong password using hash function, which included three phases: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. Nonetheless, Tseng et al. [9] and Das [10] pointed out that this protocol had some weaknesses in protecting against replay attack, forgery attack, stolenverifier attack, sensor node revealing and exposing the password to the other node and no updating user's password. In 2007, Tseng et al. [9] proposed an enhanced user authentication protocol by adding an extra phase (password changing phase) on Wong et al.'s phases. However, in 2008 Ko [11] showed the Tseng et al.'s protocol was still insecure and did not provide mutual authentication.
In 2009, Das [10] proposed a two-factor user authentication protocol based on password and smart card against stolen-verifier attack. Nevertheless, Nyang et al. [12] showed there were some security weaknesses in offline-password guessing attacks.
In 2010, Vaidya et al. [13] demonstrated the Tseng et al.'s protocol, Wong et al.'s protocol and Ko's protocol were still not strong enough to protect again replay attack, stolen-verifier attack and man-in-the-middle attack. Khan et al. [14, 15] pointed out the Das's protocol did not provide mutual authentication, and against by passing attack and privileged insider attack. Moreover, Chen et al. [16] also demonstrated the Das's protocol did not provide mutual authentication between the gateway node and the sensor node. And Chen et al. proposed a more secure and robust two-factor user authentication scheme for WSNs.
In 2011, Yeh et al. [17] found that the Chen et al.'s protocol failed to provide a secure method for updating password and insider attack. And Yeh et al. proposed a new user authentication scheme for WSNs using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Unfortunately, Han [18] found this protocol still had some weaknesses: no mutual authentication, no key agreement between the user and the sensor node, and no prefer forward security. Meanwhile, Yuan et al. [19] proposed a biometric-based user authentication for WSNs using password and smart card in 2010. Unfortunately, in 2011 Yoon et al. [20] showed the integrity problem of the Yuan et al.'s protocol and proposed a new biometric-based user authentication scheme without using password for WSNs.
In 2012, Ohood et al. [21] pointed out Yoon et al.'s scheme still had some drawbacks, such as no key agreement, no message confidentiality service, no providing against DoS and node compromise attack. Moreover, Ohood et al. [22] proposed an efficient biometric authentication protocol for WSNs.
Recently, Wenbo et al. [23] in 2013 proposed a new user authentication protocol for WSNs using elliptic curve cryptography to overcome the security weaknesses of Yeh et al.'s protocol. Although they suggested security improvements of Yeh et al.'s protocol, there were some security weaknesses in their protocol, e.g. no mutual authentication between the user and sensor node, no protecting against insider attack, forgery attack and DoS (denial of service) attack.
To address all of the issues raised in the above studies, we propose a secure user authentication protocol using identity-based cryptography on the basis of our previous studies to trusted management and trusted architecture of WSNs [24] [25] [26] . Our proposal addresses the key security issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section Related works, we review the Wenbo et al.'s protocol and a detail cryptanalysis; next we present our user authentication protocol based on identity-based encryption in Section Proposed protocol; in Section Security and performance analysis, a security and performance analysis of the related protocol is presented; in Section Conclusion, we provide some conclusion remarks.
Related works

Notation
In Table 1 , some notations used throughout this paper and their corresponding definitions are shown.
Review of Wenbo's scheme
In the Wenbo's protocol, the gateway GW held two master keys (x and y). And it was assumed that the gateway and the sensor nodes shared a long-term common secret key, SK GS = h(S n ||y). The Wenbo's protocol involves the registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password update phase, which can be briefly described as follows.
Registration phase
In this phase, a user U submits his/her ID u and a hash of his/her password to GW via a secured channel. Then, GW issues a license to U. The steps are described as follows.
Step 1: U → GW: {ID u , PS′}. U enters an identity, selects a random number br and a password PS. And U computes PS′ = h(PS⨁br). Then U sends message {ID u , PS′} to GW via a secured channel.
Step 2: GW → a smart card of U: {Bu, Wu, h(.)}. GW computes Ku = h(ID u ||x) × P, Bu = h(ID u ⨁PS′), and Wu = Bu⨁Ku, where x is a master key of GW. Then the GW stores (Bu, Wu) into a smart card and sends it to U.
Login phase
When U access Sn, U needs enter his ID u and PS. And the smart card must confirm the validity of U via the following steps.
Step 1: Validate U. The smart card check whether Bu = h(ID u ⨁h(PS⨁br)) hold. If the answer is no, the U's identification validation fails and the smart card will terminate this request. Otherwise, the smart card continues to execute the next step.
Step 2: U's smart card generates a random number r u , calculates X and a. X = r u × P, X′ = r u × (Bu⨁Wu), and a = h(ID u ||X||X′||T u ), where T u is the curren time of U's system.
Step 3: U → Sn: {ID u , X, T u , a}. The {ID u , X, Tu, a} is submitted to Sn via public channel.
The authentication phase includes: Sn checking the validity of the request message of U, GW authenticating Sn and U, Sn authenticating GW and U, U authenticating Sn and GW.
Sn checks the validity of the request message of U When receiving the login message {ID u , X, T u, a} at time T ′, Sn checks and generates request message which is sent to GW for authentication. Sn executes the following steps.
Step 1: Checks T u . Sn checks if (T′-T u )≦ΔT holds, where ΔT denotes the expected time interval for transmission delay. If the answer is yes, the validity of T u can be assured, and Sn executes the next step. Otherwise Sn rejects the login request.
Step 2: Picks a random number r s and calculates Y and b. Y = r s × P, b = h(SK GS ||ID u ||X||T u ||a||ID Sn ||Y||T s ), where T s denotes the current request time of the Sn system.
Step 3: Sn → GW: {ID u , X, T u , a, ID Sn , Y, T s , b}. The {ID u , X, T u , a, ID Sn , Y, T s , b} is submitted to GW via public channel.
GW authenticates Sn and U When receiving the request message that sent by Sn at time T′′, GW checks and validates Sn and U, and generates the response message that will be sent to Sn. GW executes the following steps.
Step 1: Validates if T s and T u . GW checks whether (T′′-T s )≦ΔT and (T′′-T u )≦ΔT hold. If the answer is yes, the validity of T s and T u can be assured and GW executes the next step. Otherwise GW rejects this request message.
Step 2: Calculates b
Step 3: Confirms whether b = b * and validates Sn. GW checks if b = b * holds. If the answer is yes, GW accepts this request message and executes the next step. Otherwise, GW rejects this request message.
Step 4: Calculates X′ and a
, where x denotes a master key of GW.
Step 5: Confirms whether a = a * . GW checks if a = a * holds. If the answer is yes, GW accepts this request message and executes the next step. Otherwise, GW rejects the request message.
Step 6: Calculates y and l.
where T G denotes the current response time of GW.
Step 7: GW → S n : {T G , y, l} The {T G , y, l} is submitted to Sn via public channel.
Sn authenticates GW When receiving the response message that sent by GW at time T′′′, Sn checks and validates GW, and generates the message that will be sent to U. Sn executes the following steps.
Step 1:
If the answer is yes, the validity of T G can be assured and Sn executes the next step. Otherwise Sn rejects the response message.
Step 2: Calculates y * .
Step 3: Validates y. Sn checks if y = y * holds. If the answer is yes, Sn accepts this response and executes the next step. Otherwise, Sn rejects this response message.
Step 4: Calculates K SU , g and session key sk.
Step 5: S n → U: {Y, T s , l, g} The {Y, T s , l, g} is submitted to U via public channel. 
U authenticates GW and Sn When receiving the response message that sent by Sn at time T′′′′, U checks and validates GW and Sn. U executes the following steps.
Step 1: Validates Ts. U checks if (T′′′′-Ts)≦ΔT holds. If the answer is yes, the validity of T S can be assured and U executes the next step. Otherwise, U rejects the response message.
Step 2: Calculates K US , l * and g
Step 3: Confirms l and g . U checks if l = l * and g = g * hold. If the answer is yes, U accepts the response message and executes the next step. Otherwise, U rejects the response message.
Step 4: Calculates session key sk.
Password update phase
When U wants to update his/her old password, U and the smart card execute the following steps.
Step 1: U inserts his/her smart card into the smart terminal and enters his/her identify ID u , the old password PS and the new password PSn.
Step 2: The smart card calculates PS′ = h(PS⨁br), and checks whether Bu = h(ID u ⨁PS′) holds. If it does not hold, the smart card stops U's request. Otherwise, the smart card continues to compute Ku = h(ID u ||PS′)⨁Wu, PSn′ = h(PSn⨁br), Bu′ = h(ID u ⨁PSn′) and Wu′ = Bu′ ⨁Ku. Finally, the smart card replaces (Bu, Wu ) with (Bu′, Wu′).
Cryptanalysis of Wenbo's protocol
Security requirements in WSNs 
No full mutual authentication
Because Wenbo's protocol does not authenticate U during the authentication phase (Sn checks the validity of the request message of U), a malicious user can attack Sn and GW by means of forging. The attack could be accomplished as follows:
(1)The attacker sends a forging message {ID a , X a , Tu a , a a } to Sn. (2)Sn sends a message {ID a , X a , Tu a , a a , ID Sn , Y, T s , b} to GW for authenticating the user when receiving the forging message.
During the above process, since Sn does not authenticate the user, Sn directly generates authenticating request message for GW to authenticate the user. When GW receives this request message, GW can finish the process from Step 1 to Step 4 of authentication phase (GW authenticates Sn and U). This is because there is no mechanism for Sn to be assured that U is real user of WSNs. Thus, the Wenbo's protocol does not provide mutual authentication between U and Sn. There is no full mutual authentication between Sn and U. This protocol cannot reject DoS attack to Sn and GW.
No protection against forgery attack
Because the confidential information (Bu, Wu) is not encrypted to be stored, the attacker can masquerade as a legal user U. In the case that an attacker steals the (Bu, Wu) from the smart card via some a Virus or a Trojan in the user terminal, he/she maybe try to impersonate user U to access resource in WSNs. The attack can be accomplished via the following means.
(1)The attacker steals the (Bu, Wu)} via some methods, such as Virus software, Trojan. (2)The attacker could compute Ku = Bu⨁Wu and gain the secret Ku. (3)The attacker picks a random number R u . (4)The attacker could computes X a = R u × P, X a ′ = R u × Ku, and a a = h (ID||X a ||X a ′||T a ) because the point P on elliptic curve E is public. (5)The attacker sends the request message {ID u , X a, T a , a a } to the Sn via public channel. (6)Sn can finish the authentication phase processes.
And GW also can accomplish the authentication phase processes.
After GW and Sn finish to authenticate, the attacker can gains the session key sk. The attacker continues to access Sn. Thus, the Wenbo's protocol does not provide sufficient protection against forgery attack.
No protection against insider attack
In the Wenbo's protocol, U uses a single password for accessing Sn. It is convenient for a user. Nevertheless, if the system manager or a privileged user of GW obtains (Bu, Wu) of U during U registration phase, he/she maybe try to impersonate U to access the resource in WSNs. The attacking processes are the same as the forgery attack. Thus, the Wenbo's protocol does not provide sufficient protection against an insider attack on GW by a privileged user.
No protection against compromise attack
In the Wenbo's protocol, the gateway and the sensor nodes shared a long-term common secret key SK GS . If an attacker captures some a sensor node, he/she can attain the shared secret key SK GS via some methods since the SK GS is not encrypted. So it is very easy to impersonate a sensor node in WSNs. Even the attacker may make many sensor nodes to impersonate the sensor nodes of in WSNs.
Proposed protocol
To solve the security weaknesses of the Wenbo's protocol, we propose a new user authentication protocol for WSNs using identity-based cryptography. First, we review the fundamentals of identity-based cryptography, and then survey the identity-based cryptography which is suitable for our design of a secure authentication protocol for WSNs. In the proposed protocol, GW integrates the trusted and reputation scheme [24, 26] . The proposed five phases are described in detail later.
Identity-based cryptography
Identity-based cryptography is a kind of public-key based scheme. The public key is the unique identity of the user. The private key is generated by a third party called a Private Key Generator (PKG) with its master secret and user's identity. In the identity-based cryptography system, firstly, the PKG must create a master public key and a master private key. Then any user may use this master public key and also use the user's identity to generate the user's public. The user's private key is created by the PKG with the user's identity.
For every two parties using in identity-based cryptography, it is easy to calculate a shared secret session key between them using its own private key and public key of another party. For example, a sensor node Sn with public key Q Sn and private key d Sn , and a user U with public key Q u and private key d u can calculate their shared secret session key by computing key = ê(Q u , d Sn ) = ê(d u , Q Sn ).
In the proposed protocol, GW is the PKG. GW selects a random number s∈Z q * that is kept secret. GW computes K pub = s × P. This public-private key pair < K pub , s > is the master key pair of GW. And GW computes Q GW = H 1 (ID GW ), d GW = s × Q GW . Q GW is the authentication public key of GW. d GW is the authentication private key of GW.
Registration phase
In the registration phase, Sn and U register to GW. The processes are the follow as.
Sensor node registration
In the WSNs, all sensor nodes must register to GW before being deployed. GW creates a private key for every sensor node. And the system parameters P set , the public functions and the private key are stored in the sensor node. GW completes the following steps.
Step 1: Creates the public key Q Sn . GW uses the identity ID Sn of Sn to generate the public key Q Sn , Q Sn = H 1 (ID Sn ).
Step 2: Generates the private key d Sn .
GW uses the master key s and the public key Q Sn to create the private key d Sn , d Sn = s × Q Sn .
Step 3: Installs system parameters, public functions and private key of Sn. GW installs the system parameters P set , d Sn and other public functions into Sn. That is to say, {P set , d Sn , h(.), f(.), H 1 (.), e(.)} is stored into the Sn.
User registration phase
Before accessing a sensor node in WSNs, any user must register to GW and gains a set P set and other parameters. The registration phase is shown in the Figure 1 .
Step 1: U → GW: {ID u , Reg-inf, T 1 }. U sends the register request message {ID u , Reg-inf, T 1 } to GW at the time T 1 .
Step2: GW → U: {ID GW , P, xP, h(.), a 1 ,T 2 }. When receiving the register request message of U at the time T′, firstly GW checks whether (T′-T 1 ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, GW rejects the register request message of U. Otherwise, GW selects a random number x∈Z q * and computes xP = x × P. Then GW calculates a 1 = h(ID GW ||ID u ||xP||T 2 ), where T 2 is the current time of GW. Finally, GW sends the register response message {ID GW , P, xP, h(.), a 1 ,T 2 } to U.
Step 3: U → GW:
When receiving the register response message {ID GW , P, xP, h(.), a 1 ,T 2 } at the time T′, U checks whether (T′-T 2 ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, U rejects the register response message. Otherwise, U computes a 1 ′ = h(ID GW ||ID u ||xP||T 2 ) and checks whether a 1 ′ = a 1 holds. If the answer is no, U rejects the register response message. Otherwise, U picks a random number y ∈Z q * and computes yP = y × P. And U selects a password PS∈Z q * and a random number br∈Z q * . U calculates PS′ = h (PS⨁br) and k = h(y × xP). Then U encrypts PS′ with the session key k, E k (PS′). Finally, U computes b = h(ID u || ID GW ||E k (PS′)||yP||T 3 ), where T 3 is the current times of U. And U sends a message {ID u , E k (PS′), yP, b, T 3 } to GW.
Step 4: GW → U: {ID GW , P set , E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ), a 2 , T 4 }. Receiving the message {ID u , E k (PS′), yP, b, T 3 } at the time T′, GW firstly checks whether (T′-T 3 ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, GW rejects this message. Otherwise, GW computes b′ = h(ID u ||ID GW ||E k (PS′)||yP||T 3 ) and checks whether b′ = b holds. If the answer is no, GW rejects this message. Otherwise, GW generates the session key k and decrypts
. GW encrypts the (Q u , Ϻ), E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ) and computes a 2 = h(ID GW ||ID u ||xyP||T 4 ). At last GW stores (P set , E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ), h(.), f(.), H1(.), ê(.)) into a smart card that is sent to U. Moreover GW sends the register acknowledge message {ID GW , a 2 , T 4 } to U.
Step 5: U encrypts and stores br. When receiving the register acknowledge message {ID GW , a 2 , T 4 } at the time T′, U firstly checks whether (T′-T 4 ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, U rejects this message. Otherwise U computes a 2 ′ = h(ID GW ||ID u ||yxP||T 4 ) and checks whether a 2 ′ = a 2 holds. If the answer is no, U rejects this message. Otherwise, U computes ks = h(PS|| ID u ) and encrypts br, E ks (br). Finially U stores E ks (br).
Login phase and authentication phase
Accessing the data in Sn, U must login Sn and be authenticated by GW and Sn. And U must complete the login phase and authentication phase. Login phase and authentication phase are shown in Figure 2 .
Login phase
U must enter his ID u and password PS firstly. Then, after the smart card validates U via the following steps, the smart card sends the access request message to Sn.
Step 1: Gains br. U enters his identity ID u and password PS to the smart terminal. And the smart terminal computes ks = h(PS|| ID u ), and D ks (E ks (br)) to gain br.
Step 2: Validate U. The smart card computes PS′ = h(PS⨁br), ϴ′ = h(PS′|| ID u ) and D ϴ′ (E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ)) to gain the (ϴ, Ϻ). The smart card checks whether ϴ = ϴ′ holds. If the answer is no, the smart card stops and alarms. Otherwise, the smart card continues to execute the next step.
Step 3: Computes Q Sn , Q GW , d u , X and Y.
Step 4: Generates a, b and encrypts (a, b).
The smart card calculates a = h(ID u ||ID GW ||Y||T u ), b = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||X||a||T u ) and E X (a, b), where T u is the current time of the smart terminal system.
Step 5: U → Sn: {ID u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u }. The smart card sends the login request message {ID u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u } to the Sn.
Authentication phase
The authentication phase includes Sn authenticating U and GW, GW authenticating Sn and U, U authenticating Sn and GW. The authentication phase can complete the mutual authentication.
Sensor node Sn authenticates user U When receiving the login request message {ID u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u } sent by U at time T′, Sn firstly checks the validity of the request message. Then Sn authenticates U.
Step 1: Validates login request message. Sn checks whether (T′-T u ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, Sn rejects the login request of U. Otherwise, it continues to perform the next step.
Step 2: Decrypts E X (a, b). S n computes Q u = H 1 (ID u ), X′ = ê(Q u , d Sn ) and D X′ (E X (a, b)) to gain (a, b).
Step 3: Computes b′ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||X′||a||T u ).
Step 4: Validates U. S n checks if b = b′ holds. If the answer is yes, the validity of U can be assured and Sn continues to perform the next step. Otherwise, it rejects the login request message of U.
Step 5: Computes Q GW , Z, β and encrypts.
and β = h(ID u || ID Sn ||Z||a||T u ||T Sn ), where T Sn is the current time of Sn system. And Sn encrypts (a, β), E Z (a, β).
Step 6: S n → GW: {ID Sn , ID GW , IDu, E Z (a, β), T u , T Sn } Sn sends a request message {ID Sn , ID GW , ID u , E Z (a, β), T u , T Sn } to GW.
Gateway GW authenticates sensor node Sn When receiving the request message {ID Sn , ID GW , ID u , E Z (a, β), T u , T Sn } at time T′′, GW checks the validity of this message firstly. And GW authenticates Sn and U. Finally, GW creates a response message for Sn and U.
Step 1: Validates request message of Sn. GW checks whether (T′′-T u ) ≤ ΔT and (T′′-T Sn ) ≤ ΔT hold. If the answer is no, GW rejects the request message. Otherwise, GW continues to perform the next step.
Step 2: Computes Q Sn , Z′ and gains (a, β). a, β) ) to gain (a, β).
Step 3: Computes β′ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||Z′|a||T u ||T Sn ).
Step 4: Validates Sn. GW checks if β′ = β holds. If the answer is yes, the validity of Sn can be assured and GW continues to perform the next step. Otherwise, it rejects the request message.
Step 5: Computes Q u , Y′ and a′. Step 6: Validates U. GW checks if a′ = a holds. if the answer is yes, the validity of U can be assured and GW continues to perform the next step. Otherwise, GW rejects the request message.
Step 7: GW → Sn:{ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ),T GW }. GW generates the response message for Sn and U. GW calculates: γ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||ID GW ||Y′||T u ||T Sn ) and δ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||ID GW ||Z′||γ||T Sn ||T GW ), where T GW is the current time of GW's system. And GW encrypts (γ, δ) with the key Z′, E Z′ (γ, δ), and sends the response message {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ), T GW } to Sn.
Sensor node Sn authenticates gateway GW When receiving the response message {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ), T GW } sent by GW at time T′′′, Sn checks and authenticates GW via the following steps.
Step 1: Validates the response message.
Sn checks if (T′′′-T GW ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, Sn rejects this response message. Otherwise, Sn continues to perform the next step.
Step 2: Gains (γ, δ). Sn decrypts the E Z′ (γ, δ) with the key Z, D Z (E Z′ (γ, δ)), to gain (γ, δ).
Step 3: Computes δ′.
Step 4: Validates GW. Sn checks if δ′ = δ holds. If th answer is yes, the validity of GW can be assured and S n continues to execute the next step. Otherwise, it rejects the response message.
Step 5: Generates K session , ζ and encrypts.
Þ and E X ′ ζ; γ ð Þ:
Step 6:
Sn sends the response message {ID Sn , ID u , ID GW , E X′ (ζ, γ), T Sn } to U.
User U authenticates sensor node Sn When U receives Sn's response message {ID Sn , ID u , ID GW , E X′ (ζ, γ), T Sn } at time T′′′′, U checks this message and authenticates Sn and GW. U performs the following steps.
Step 1: Validates the response message. U checks whether (T′′′′-T Sn ) ≤ ΔT holds. If the answer is no, U rejects this response message. Otherwise, it continues to perform the next step.
Step 2: Gains (ζ, γ). U computes D X (E X′ (ζ, γ)) to decrypt E X′ (ζ, γ) with the key X to gain (ζ, γ).
Step 3: Generates K session and ζ′. U computes K session = h(X||T u ||T Sn ), and ζ′ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||K session ||γ||T Sn )
Step 4: Validates Sn. U checks whether ζ = ζ′ holds. If the answer is yes, the validity of Sn can be assured and U continues to execute the next step. Otherwise, U rejects the response message.
Step 5: Computes γ′ = h(ID u ||ID Sn ||ID GW ||Y||T u ||T Sn ).
Step 6: Validates GW. U checks whether γ′ = γ holds. If the answer is yes, the validity of GW can be assured and U accepts this response message. Otherwise, U rejects this response message.
After U authenticates Sn and GW, U will access the data of the Sn with the session key K session .
Password update phase
When U updates his password, U enters his ID u , old password PS and news password PSn to the smart terminal or a update password program. The smart card must compute a new password value, which is encrypted and stored in the smart card. The user password update phase includes the following steps.
Step 1: U enters his ID u , old password PS and news password PSn to the smart terminal or a update password program.
Step 2: The smart terminal computes ks = h(PS||ID u ) and D ks (E ks (br)) to gain br firstly. Then it computes PS′ = h(PS⨁br), PSn′ = h(PSn⨁br). The smart terminal sends {ID u , PS′, PSn′} to the smart card.
Step 3: The smart card computes ϴ′ = h(PS′||ID u ) and D ϴ′ (E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ)) to gain (ϴ, Ϻ).
Step 4: The smart card checks whether ϴ′ = ϴ holds. If the answer is no, the smart card rejects the password update and alarms. Otherwise, the smart card continues to perform the next step.
Step 5: The smart card calculates ϴ n ′ = h(PSn′||ID u ) and Ϻ′ = ϴ n ′⨁(ϴ⨁Ϻ).
Step 6: The smart card encrypts the new sensitive password value (ϴ n ′, Ϻ′) with the key ϴ n ′, E ϴn′ (ϴ n ′, Ϻ′), and replaces the E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ) with E ϴn′ (ϴ n ′, Ϻ′).
Security and performance analysis
The proposed protocol provides message confidentiality service Proof Message confidentiality service against eavesdropping attack is performed by data encryption service. Our proposed protocol can provide sufficient confidentiality for sensitive data stored and transmitted with encrypting data (e.g. E k (PS′), E ϴ (ϴ,Ϻ), E X (a, b), E Z (a, β), E Z′ (γ, δ) and E X′ (ζ, γ). More specifically, these sensitive information are confidential against the attacker. If the sensitive data is stored or transmitted without encryption in the public channel , the attacker maybe view the plaintext data. This attack maybe occur in Wenbo's protocol and Yoon and Yoo's protocol [15] . Moreover, in Wenbo's protocol the sensitive (Bu, Wu) that was not encrypted was stored in the smart card and the long-term shared secret key SK GW was not also encrypted in the Sn. In the [15] Sn's response message that was not encrypted was sent to U by a public channel directly.
The proposed protocol resists an integrity attack Proof
The data integrity attack includes data modification attack, data corruption attack and data insertion attack. The integrity service assures the transmitted data is not modified by an unauthorized entity.
In our proposed protocol, Sn can guarantee the login request message {ID u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u } from U has not been modified by an unauthorized entity via decrypting E X (a, b), recomputing and checking b. GW can also guarantee the authentication request message {ID Sn , ID GW , IDu, E Z (a, β), T u , T Sn } from Sn has not been modified by an unauthorized entity via decrypting E Z (a, β), recomputing and checking a, β. Similarly, Sn can guarantee the authentication response message {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ), T GW } from GW has not been modified by an unauthorized entity via decrypting E Z′ (γ, δ), recomputing and checking δ. Moreover, U uses the same way to guarantee the authentication response message {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E X′ (ζ, γ), T Sn } from Sn has not been modified.
The proposed protocol resists a denial attack Proof
This type of attack is that the participating entity denies in all of the operations or part of its. However, in our proposed protocol, we assume that GW is a trusted party. And GW creates the unique private key for every entity (sensor node, user) . Although GW does not store the private key of an entity, it can trace the entity operations with the entity's public key and HMAC. Therefore, the entity cannot deny that he/she performed all participation.
The proposed protocol resists a DoS Attack Proof
The DoS attack can be occurred by the attacker who transmitting the large number of request messages to Sn or GW in the login phase or in the authentication phase. In our proposed protocol, since every message associates with a timestamp T and is authenticated, the unauthenticated message or the timeout message is rejected. So the proposed protocol can reject DoS attack.
The proposed protocol resists a sensor node compromise attack Proof
Since WSNs is normally deployed in an open environment, the attacker is easy to capture a sensor node and may attempt to get some information stored in the sensor node. When the attacker gets the secret from the capturing sensor node, he/she can attack the WSNs. If the authenticating user and data access from the sensor node are allowed directly to the user without the license of gateway, this attack is very high, which occurs in Watro et al.'s scheme [19] .
In our proposed protocol, And U does not access data from Sn until it is authorized by GW and Sn. And U's request message must be authenticated by Sn firstly, and the request message must be authenticated by GW. After that GW sends the license of U's to Sn and U. Only U can access the data of sensor node when his/her license from GW is the same as Sn's from GW. Moreover, in our proposed protocol GW can monitor whether a sensor node is captured with the trusted and reputation management scheme [24, 26] . If some a sensor node is captured by an attacker, GW can detect and isolate it.
The proposed protocol resists a replay attack Proof
The replay attacks are impossible if the previous information is not reused again. In our proposed protocol, the login message and the authentication message are validated by checking timestamps. When an attacker eavesdrops the communication between U and Sn or between Sn and GW, he/she does not reusable again. We assume if an adversary intercepts a login request message {ID u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u } and attempts replaying the same message for login to Sn. The verification of the login request fails because of (T a -T u ) > ΔT, where T a denotes the time when Sn receives the replaying message. Similarly, if an adversary intercepts {ID Sn , ID GW , ID u , E Z (a, β), T u , T Sn }and attempts to replay it to GW, he/she cannot pass the verification of GW because the time expires (i.e. (T b -T Sn ) > ΔT and (T b -T u ) > ΔT), where T b denotes the time when the replaying message is received by GW. Also if an adversary intercepts {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ), T GW } and attempts replaying the same message to Sn, he/she cannot pass the verification of Sn because of (T c -T GW ) > ΔT, where T c denotes the time when Sn receives the replaying response message. Moreover, if an adversary intercepts {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E X′ (ζ, γ), T Sn } and attempts replaying the same message to U, he/she also cannot pass the verification of U because of (T d -T Sn > ΔT), where T d denotes the time when U receives the replaying response message.
The proposed protocol resists an impersonation attack Proof
In our proposed protocol, all sensitive information that is transmitted is encrypted with some a key. Additionally, the messages are validated and authenticated. Only when an attacker knows the master key s or solves Bilinear Differ-Hellman Problem can he/she attain the private key. It is impossible for an attacker.
In the login phase, only when an attacker knows U's private key d u can he/she generate a legal login request message {D u , ID Sn , E X (a, b), T u } to impersonate the U. Moreover it is impossible that an attacker gains the sensitive key material (ϴ, Ϻ) that is encrypted to only be stored in the smart card without the user U's password. Thus it is not possible to compute X without d u for an attacker. And as long as an attacker does not possess Sn's private key d Sn , he/she cannot generate a legal authentication request message {ID Sn , ID GW , IDu, E Z (a, β) , T u , T Sn } and {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E X′ (ζ, γ), T Sn } to impersonate Sn. This is because that the attacker cannot compute the key Z and the key X′ without d Sn . Similarly, an attacker also cannot generate a legal response message {ID GW , ID Sn , ID u , E Z′ (γ, δ), T GW } to impersonate GW. This is due to that an attacker does not know the private key d GW of GW.
The proposed protocol resists a stolen verifier attack Proof
An attacker who has stolen U's private key materials E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ) from the smart terminal or the smart card via the Trojan or other intruding methods cannot obtain any useful information. This is due to that the private key materials are encrypted. The attacker cannot decrypt E ϴ (ϴ, Ϻ) to gain (ϴ, Ϻ) without U's password PS. And the attacker also cannot attain any useful private key information of U from GW because U's private key materials are not stored in the GW database.
The proposed protocol resists a stolen smart card attacks Proof
The attacker who has stolen U's smart card cannot impersonate this user to access S n . Because the attacker does not know U's password, the smart card does not validate the login request and rejects the access request of the attacker.
The proposed protocol resists an insider attack Proof
The insider attack is intentionally misused by authorized entities. In our proposed protocol, the gateway manager or system administrator cannot attain U's password PS because in the registration phase U transmits E k (PS′) to GW instead of the plain password PS, and any sensitive key material information of U and any verifier table are not stored in GW. Additionally, the smart terminal manager or administrator also cannot attain the useful information of U's key from the smart card and the smart terminal because of the sensitive key material encrypted. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the privileged insider attacks.
The proposed protocol resists a man-in-the-middle attack Proof
The man-in-the-middle attack is that an attacker intercepts the communication between the legal user and other entity (e.g. sensor node, gateway) and successfully masquerades as the user or other entity by some methods. In our proposed protocol, U is authenticated by Sn in the login phase, Sn and U are authenticated by GW in the authentication request phase, and Sn also authenticates GW in the authentication response phase, U validates Sn and GW in the authentication response phase. That is to say, our proposed protocol can provide complete mutual authenticate among entities and resists the man-in-the-middle attack. Table 2 shows the security functionality comparisons between our proposed protocol and the related protocols. According to the Table 2 , although the Ohood et al.'s protocol presents the same security as ours, the Ohood et al.'s protocol needs some complicated biometric equipments. Compared against each other, our protocol provides is more security services than the other protocols.
Performance analysis The section summarizes the performance results of the proposed protocol. We define the notation Th as the hash function computation cost, Texp as the modular exponential computation cost, Tpm as the elliptic curve point multiply cost, Tpa as the elliptic curve point addition cost, Tpair as pairing computation cost, Trc as RC5 computation cost, Taes as AES computation cost, Te as the elliptic curve polynomial computation cost. The comparison of related protocols is illustrated in the Table 3 .
According to Table 3 Our proposed protocol needs eighteen hash function computations, four elliptic curve point multiply computations, eleven AES computations and six pairing computations. Although our protocol needs more computations than their protocols, their protocols suffer from security issues or need complicated biometric equipments. Our protocol addressed these issues and provides better security and more security services than the other related protocols.
Conclusion
In the paper, we discussed an approach of data capturing for big data that is data collecting via sensor networks and its user authentication protocol. We have analyzed Wenbo et al.'s user authentication protocol for WSNs. The Wenbo's protocol, which does not provide mutual authentication between user and sensor node and confidentiality service, is susceptible to insider, replay, denial, compromise, forgery, man-in-the-middle and DoS attacks. We have also reviewed the protocols of Yeh et al., which does not provide mutual authentication and protect against insider, denial, compromise, man-in-themiddle and DoS attacks, of Das, which is vulnerable to forgery, denial, compromise, DoS, man-in-the-middle attacks, of Benenson et al., which susceptible to denial, compromise, DoS, man-in-the-middle attacks, of Chen et al. which is vulnerable to denial, insider, compromise and DoS attacks, of other biometric authentication protocols. Since WSNs need more secure mutual authentication method in an insecure network environment, we use the IBE mechanism to design a news user authentication protocol. Our protocol can prevent all the problems of the former schemes. Furthermore, it enhances the WSNs authentication with higher security than the other protocol. Therefore, the protocol is more suited to open and higher security WSNs environment in despite of more computation cost. 
